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Abstract
We present an OLG endogenous growth model in which a reduction
in the level of concentration in the banking industry exterts two opposite
eﬀects on economic growth. On the one hand, it induces economies of
specialisation which enhances intermediation eﬃciency and thereby eco-
nomic growth. On the other hand, it results in duplication of Þxed costs
which is detrimental for eﬃciency and growth. The trade oﬀ between the
two opposing eﬀects is ambiguous and can vary along with the dynamic
process of Þnancial and economic development. Using cross country in-
dustry data we Þnd that banking concentration is negatively associated
with industrial growth only in low income countries while there is no such
asssociation in high income countries. These empirical Þndings support
the models prediction that there exist a diﬀerent relationship between
banking concentration and growth depending on the level of economic
development.
JEL ClassiÞcation: E44, O16
Keywords:Economic growth, Economic development, Concentration,
Banking Industry
∗We would like to thank Laurence Harris, Pasquale Scaramozzino and Laixiang Sun for
detailed comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are our own. Corresponding author:
Bassam Fattouh, Centre for Financial and Management Studies, SOAS, Thornhaugh Street,
Russell Square, London WC1H 0XG. Tel.: 0044-20-76911699, Fax: 0044-20-76377075, E-mail:
bf11@soas.ac.uk.
1. Introduction
The recent theoretical literature on Þnance and development establishes that
Þnancial development and long run economic growth are linked phenomena.
Various models within this literature predict that the development of Þnancial
intermediation services contributes to growth since, by creating liquidity and
risk diversiÞcation opportunities and mitigating informational asymmetries by
means of monitoring and screening technologies, it favours the allocation of
Þnancial resources toward the most productive investment projects.1 An ex-
tensive amount of empirical work oﬀers support for this leading view. Cross
country linear econometric analyses, like for instance King and Levine (1993a,
1993b), document the existence of a strong relationship between initial Þnan-
cial development and subsequent growth.2 Other studies, like for instance Rajan
and Zingales (1998) conÞrm that Þnancial development can have a causal role
in the growth process.3
Comparatively less attention has been paid, so far, to the issue of whether
the provision of growth inducing intermediation services is aﬀected by structure
of the credit market. The traditional argument suggests that departures from
perfect competition are detrimental for growth insofar they are bound to gen-
erate ineﬃciencies in the allocation mechanism provided by the credit market.
However, it is a well known fact that in a second best world moving toward per-
fect competition does not necessarily guarantee Pareto improvements. Hence,
to the extent that Þnancial intermediaries emerge as a second best response to
the (informational) imperfections endemically associated with Þnancial transac-
tions, there is no reason to expect that an increase in the degree of competition
and a reduction of concentration in the credit industry would necessarily im-
prove the eﬃciency of intermediation.
On this account, DellAriccia (2000) and Gehrig (1998) Þnd that competition
in the credit industry has an ambiguous eﬀect on socially valuable screening
activity by Þnancial intermediaries.4 Along similar lines, Petersen and Rajan
1Khan (2001), Boyd and Smith (1998), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), Roubini and Sala-
i-Martin (1995), De Gregorio (1993), King and Levine (1993b), Bencivenga and Smith (1991,
1993, 1995), Saint-Paul (1992), Levine (1991) and Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), are key
examples of this strand of literature. Comprehensive surveys on the topic are those by Levine
(1997) and Pagano (1993).
2Other cross sectional studies are those by Jose De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995), and
Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992).
3For another approach to the issue of causality between Þnance and growth see Levine,
Loayza and Beck (2000).
4See also Manove, Pagano and Padilla (2000) in which monopolistic power might induce
an eﬃcient level of screening.
1
(1995) argue that monopolistic power facilitates the establishment of lending
relationships which facilitates valuable Þrms access to credit.5 Cetorelli and
Peretto (2000) elaborate further on this line of thought by proposing a model
in which the type of lending relationship emerging in the context of competitive
credit markets can have negative consequences for capital accumulation, while
banks market power can be beneÞcial for growth. The argument is that in
presence of market power, banks have more incentive to undertake screening
activities since they can extract a rent from the information advantage this
would generate. However, associated with this rent is the typical ineﬃciency
in quantities generated by monopolistic behaviour. Under speciÞc conditions,
the optimal trade-oﬀ between the two eﬀects is achieved by an oligopolistic
structure of the credit market.
Empirical tests of the relationship between market structure and growth oﬀer
mixed evidence. Bonaccorsi and DellAriccia (2000), and Petersen and Rajan
(1995) oﬀer evidence that Þrms are less credit constrained and face cheaper
credit the more concentrated is the credit market. On the other hand Cetorelli
and Gambera (2001) Þnd that, although some Þrms and industries beneÞt from
greater banking concentration, the overall impact on industrial growth is nega-
tive. Black and Stranhan (2002) Þnd that less concentration is associated with
higher levels of newly created Þrms.
In this paper we abstract from the issue of lending relationships and other
sources of ineﬃciency that perfect competition might induce in the presence of
non trivial asymmetric information problems. Instead, the focus is on the trade
oﬀ between economies to scale and economies to specialisation in the provision
of Þnancial intermediation services within the context of a growth model char-
acterised by a monopolistically competitive credit market with costly Þnancial
transactions.6 Within this set up, a reduction in the level of concentration of
the banking industry has two opposite eﬀects. On the one hand it induces dupli-
cation of Þxed costs, which is detrimental for eﬃciency of Þnancial transactions
and thereby economic growth. On the other hand it increases specialisation
which enhances eﬃciency and growth. One interesting feature of the model is
that the trade oﬀ between the two opposite eﬀects of concentration changes
along the process of economic development. For instance, whenever the mar-
ginal eﬀect of specialisation on intermediation costs is increasing in the level of
concentration (i.e. decreasing returns to specialisation), the specialisation ef-
fect dominates at suﬃciently low levels of economic development, while the net
5Other contributions on the subject include Shaﬀer (1998) and Riordan (1993).
6On the existence of economies of specialisation in the banking industry with reference to
the US economy and their signiÞcance see Sussman and Zeira (1995).
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growth-eﬀect of the interaction between specialisation and duplication eﬀects
becomes negative at suﬃciently high levels of development.
We explore the models implications using Rajan and Zingales (1998) cross-
country industry data set, augmented recently by Cetorelli et al (2001) to in-
clude various measures of concentration of the banking sector. We split their
sample into high and low income countries, and examine the relationship be-
tween concentration and industrial growth in each of the two sub-samples.. We
Þnd that concentration in the banking industry is negatively associated with
growth only in low-income countries, while there is no such association in high-
income countries. These results support the models prediction that there exists
a diﬀerent relationship between banking concentration and industrial growth de-
pending on the level of economic development. They also suggest that greater
competition among banks is more likely to promote growth in low-income coun-
tries, while in high income countries the beneÞts that arise from further spe-
cialisation may not be important enough to oﬀset the costs associated with the
duplication eﬀect.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model while section
3 discusses the empirical methodology and results. The last section concludes.
2. The Model
The economy is made of a continuum of Þrms and overlapping generations of
individuals of size 1. Individuals are identical and live for two periods. They
derive utility from consumption in each of the two periods according to U =
ln ct+β ln ct+1 where ct and ct+1 are consumption in the Þrst and second period
of life, respectively, for an individual born at time t, and β is the intertemporal
discount factor. Each young individual is endowed with 1 unit of labour which
s/he supplies inelastically to Þrms earning a salary wt which is partly consumed
in the Þrst period of life and partly saved to Þnance consumption in the second
period. With logarithmic preferences, individual savings are equal to St = swt
where s = β/(1 + β). Savings Þnance Þrms capital accumulation, i.e. kt+1 =
swt, where kt+1 is capital per head.
Firms are identical and operate in a perfectly competitive fashion. Produc-





where Yt is the level of output produced by a single Þrm combining capital Kt
and labour, L. At = Kt/L = kt is the standard learning by doing externality.
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Factors are paid their marginal product:






We assume that Þnancing Þrms capital accumulation requires a Þxed cost C
plus a cost c(z) per unit of lending, where z is the mass of Þrms being funded,
both measured in terms of consumption of real resources.7 We assume
dc
dz
= c0(z) > 0 (2.4)
which implies economies to specialisation.8 This cost structure justiÞes the
emergence of a credit market where intermediaries pool savings and fund Þrms
investments. The existence of economies to specialisation implies that the credit
market can be characterised by the presence of more than one intermediary. We
assume that the intermediaries operate in the context of a standard monopolistic
competition framework, with no strategic interaction among players.
2.1. Intermediaries Behaviour and Equilibrium in the Credit Market







c(z)btdz + C, (2.5)
whereDt are deposits pooled by the bank,
R zt
0 btzt is aggregate loans of the bank,
and
R zt
0 c(z)dz plus C is the aggregate consumption of real resources necessary
to perform the intermediation service, given the amount of per Þrm loan, bt,
and the mass of Þrms funded, zt.
Banks act as price takers in the market for deposits. Hence they take the
interest rate on deposits, Rdt+1, as given. For a given level of the interest rate
on loans Rt+1 the proÞts of the representative bank (all banks are identical) can
be written as
7The assumption of costly Þnancial transactions is consistent either with a transaction
costs interpretation or with the existence of informational asymmetries (not explicity modelled
here) that are eﬃciently eliminated by incurring costs.
8The assumption implies that as the mass of Þrms funded by the bank decreases, the
average cost of monitoring is reduced. We interpret this eﬀect as economies to specialisation
to the extent that the cost of monitoring a Þrm decreases the closer the bank is to the Þrm.
Hence, to a higher mass of Þrms it corresponds a higher degree of Þrms variety with respect
to monitoring costs, and hence higher average variable costs. See Sussman (1993) for model














is the demand for loans by the individual Þrm.9 According to expression (2.6)
banks proÞts are given by total revenues
R zt
0 Rt+1bt(Rt)dz minus costs, R
d
t+1Dt.
Each bank selects the level of Rt and the level of zt in order to maximise proÞts.
Since banks are identical we focus on symmetric equilibria in which zt and
Rt+1 are the same across banks. The choice of zt is subject to a feasibility
constraint zt ≤ 1/nt, where nt is number of operating banks. We assume that
the individual bank takes nt as given and also disregards other banks actions






































{Rt+1 − [1 + c(zt)]}Rdt+1,
where λ = 0 if the optimal level of zt satisÞes zt < H/nt as a strict inequality. In
equilibrium, for any two banks j and i zit = z
j
t . If zt = zm < 1/nt banks operate
as local pure monopolists. Otherwise, they equally share the market, i.e. zt =
1/nt. As we are interested in movements of the market share zt we concentrate
on the latter case in which the market share constraint is binding. Given the
9Note that in equilibrium demand for capital at time t, bt(.), equals capital per Þrm at
period t+ 1,Kt+1.
5
optimal level of Rt+1 (see equation (2.9)), the value function describing the











In equilibrium, At = k1−αt holds, so that Rt = αφ. Hence, recalling that kt+1 =
swt, and assuming zt = 1/nt, the set of equations describing the equilibrium is
Rdt+1 =
α2φztR zt
0 1 + c(z)dz
(2.11)
wt+1 = (1− α)φkt+1 (2.12)
kt+1 =
[s(1− α)φkt − C/zt]R zt











Correspondingly, the equilibrium growth rate for the economy is
gt =
[s(1− α)φ− C/ktzt]R zt
0 1 + c(z)dz/zt
− 1 = [s(1− α)φ−C/ktzt]
c¯(zt)
− 1 (2.15)






0 1 + c(z)dz/zt is average variable costs of intermediation, and
nmaxt is the maximum number of banks which could operate in the economy
given the zero proÞt condition, πt = 0, associated with a perfectly contestable
credit market. It can be noticed that nmaxt is a linear increasing function in the
level of economic development. When the credit market is fully contestable, the
number of operating banks in the economy is positively associated with the level
of economic development, yt, which implies that zt would be negatively related
to yt. More generally, once we Þxed a certain degree of contestability and the
associated level of per bank equilibrium proÞts, say π¯, then similarly to the
case of perfect contestability, the equilibrium level of concentration would be
decreasing in the level of economic development. To verify this note that starting
at πt = π¯, as kt increases, holding Þxed the number of banks, the equilibrium
level of bank proÞts, πt, raises above π¯ which stimulate the entrance of new
banks. Therefore, the number of operating banks increase and zt is reduced up
to the point that equality πt = π¯ holds.
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2.3. Concentration in the credit market and economic growth
The analysis of equation (2.15) reveals that the concentration level zt aﬀects the
growth rate of the economy in two opposite ways. On one side a reduction in
the level of concentration implies more specialisation, which reduces the average
variable costs c¯(zt) =
R zt





[1− c(zt)]zt − R zt0 1 + c(z)dz]
[
R zt
0 1 + c(z)dz]
2
> 0 (2.17)
holds, so that if zt decreases, this reduces c¯(zt). Since c¯(zt) aﬀects growth
negatively, this specialisation eﬀect is beneÞcial for growth. On the other hand,
a reduction in the level of concentration, which is always associated with an
increase in the number of operating banks, implies an increase in total Þxed
costs ntC. This cost duplication eﬀect has adverse consequences for growth. In
principle, the trade oﬀ between these two eﬀects is ambiguous. This can be seen




s(1− α)φ{R zt0 1 + c(z)dz − [1 + c(zt)]zt}+ [1 + c(zt)]C/kt
[
R zt
0 1 + c(z)dz]
2
, (2.18)





1 + c(z)dz − [1 + c(zt)]zt}+
Bz }| {
[1 + c(zt)]C/kt > 0 (2.19)
and negative otherwise. The term A is negative due to the specialisation eﬀect,
while the term B, which refers to the duplication eﬀect, is positive.
Assume that the magnitude of the specialisation eﬀect decreases faster than
the duplication eﬀect as zt decreases due to new entrances in the credit mar-
ket stimulated by economic development. Then, we should observe that the
growth eﬀect of an increase in concentration is negative at suﬃciently low levels
of economic development, and positive otherwise. For instance, if we assume









which implies that, for a given level of kt, an increase in the concentration level
is detrimental for growth for zt greater than some critical value z∗. Let us
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assume that the credit market is perfectly contestable so that nt = nmaxt . Under









[(1− α)2φskt + aC)]C
(1− α)2φsk2t
> 0, (2.22)
so that under the assumption of a perfectly constestable credit market concen-





2(1− α) ] ≡ k
∗, (2.23)
where k∗ is positive for α > 1/2. Hence, for kt > k∗, perfect contestability
produces excessive proliferation of banks, i.e. too little concentration, while the
opposite is true for kt < k∗. By the continuity argument, for kt < k∗, a reduction
in the concentration level due to an increase in the degree of contestability of
the credit market is surely growth inducive for kt < k∗. On the other hand, for
kt > k∗, a reduction in the concentration forced by increased contestability is
more likely to be detrimental for growth the higher is the status quo level of
contestability. By the same token, the above discussion implies that we should
observe a diﬀerent relationship between concentration and growth at diﬀerent
levels of economic development.
3. Empirical SpeciÞcation, Data and Results
We examine the relationship between the concentration of the banking system
and industrial growth using Rajan and Zingales (1998) cross-country industry
data, augmented recently by Cetorelli et al (2001) to include various measures
of concentration of the banking sector. The sample includes 36 industries (all
belonging to the manufacturing sector) from 41 countries, yielding a very large
sample consisting of 1150 observations.10 In order to test whether the relation-
ship between banking concentration and growth is diﬀerent depending on the
level of economic development, we split the sample into high-income (mainly
OECD economies) and low-income countries. 11 For each sub-sample, we esti-
10For a detailed description of the data set, see Rajan and Zingales (1998).
11We split the overall sample based on the World Bank classiÞcation. The list of countries
in each of the sub-samples is reported in Table 1.
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mate the empirical model adopted by Cetorelli et al (2001) in which the rate
of growth of real value added for each industrial sector in each country (GTH)
is regressed on industry dummies (IND), country controls (CNTRL), industry
share of manufacturing value added (SHARE) and a measure of banking con-
centration (CONC). The growth equation for each sub-sample may be estimated
via OLS, accounting for the fact that each sub-sample is a non-random sam-
ple of all available observations. This is accomplished via Heckmans selection
correction model where in the Þrst stage, a probit model is used to predict the
probability of a country belonging to a certain income group and in the second
stage, the appropriate inverse Mills ratio is included as a regressor.12 We then
employ the Chow test statistic to test the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients
on banking concentration are the same across the high-income group and low-
income groups (see Hsiao, 1986).13 Rejection of the null hypothesis would be
consistent with the models theoretical prediction that there exists a diﬀerent
relationship between banking concentration and industrial growth depending on
the level of economic development.
3.1. Empirical SpeciÞcation
The basic growth equation model estimated is
GTHj, k = const+ a1INDj + a2CNTRLk + a3SHARCj,k + a4CONCk + ej,k
(3.1)
where ej,k is the error term, the subscript j indicates that the variable refers
to the j-th industry j, ai are vectors of coeﬃcients to be estimated,and the
subscript k indicates that the variable relates to the k-th country.
The vector of country control variables are used to control for important
economic phenomena that aﬀect economic growth. In this study, the vector
of country controls (CNTRL) includes initial income per capita, a measure of
initial human capital and a measure of banking development. We expect indus-
tries in initially richer countries to grow slower, higher initial secondary school
enrollment rates to be associated with faster subsequent industrial growth, and
higher levels of banking development to be associated with higher industrial
growth rates. In order to compare our results with existing empirical studies,
12See Main and Reilly (1993) for a similar application and Maddala (1983) for a discussion
of this issue. In this paper, the results with and without the Heckmans selection correction
model are very similar. The results without the Heckmans selection correction are reported
in Tables 3 and 4 in the appendix.
13The F-test is constructed without constraining the residual variance across equations.
The results with constraining the residual variance across produces very similar results.
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we also include a measure of stock market capitalization and the quality of
accounting standards as an additional control variable. The stock market capi-
talization controls for the relative importance of alternative sources to banking
Þnance and is expected to be positively correlated with industrial growth. The
accounting standards measure is an index reßecting the quality of disclosure
of the Þrms annual reports. The stronger are these standards, the lower the
information costs that banks have to incur in monitoring these Þrms. Thus, the
expected coeﬃcient on this variable is also positive.
The industry dummies are used to control for industry speciÞc eﬀects whereas
the industry share of manufacturing value added (SHARE) is used as an addi-
tional control variable to control for industry-speciÞc convergence eﬀect and as
such plays a role similar to that of per capita income in cross-country growth
regressions. Sectors that have already witnessed very high growth rates in the
past are likely to grow at slower rates in the future.
Finally, the level of banking concentration in each country CONC is used
to test for the eﬀect of banking market structure on industrial growth.14 As
our theoretical discussion suggests, this eﬀect can be diﬀerent depending on the
level of economic development. Hence we expect the coeﬃcient a4 in model (3.1)
to be signiÞcantly diﬀerent across the high-income and low income groups.
3.2. Data
We use Rajan and Zingaless cross country industry data set (1998) augmented
recently by Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) to include concentration measures
of the banking sector. The relevant growth variable is the rate of growth of
real value added for each industrial sector, averaged over the 1980-1990 period.
Initial human capital is measured by the average school years in the population
over 25 in 1980. Initial income per capita is measured by the log of per capita
income in 1980. Banking development is the ratio of private credit to GDP
averaged over the 1980-1990 period. Stock market capitalization is the ratio of
stock market to GDP in 1980. Finally, banking concentration is measured by
the sum of market shares (in terms of total assets) of the three largest banks
averaged over the 1989-1996 period.
14It is possible to argue that the banking market structure adjusts to a level that is optimal
for a countrys industrial structure which raises the issue of potential endogeneity of the
market structure. This argument, however, ignores the fact that there are political and
regulatory institutions that aﬀect the natural development of the market structure of the
banking system (Cetorelli et al, 2001). Despite the validity of this argument, we address the
issue of endogeneity using the instrumental variable estimation approach.
10
3.3. Empirical Results
Table 1 reports the estimation results for the low-income and the high- income
groups and for the full sample. The estimates for the full sample replicate
Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) results and are reported here for the sake of
comparison. The control variables are introduced once at a time to check the
robustness of our results to the inclusion of control variables. For each regres-
sion, we report the Durbin-Wu-Hausamn test of over-identifying restrictions
(Davidson and McKinnon, 1993), which tests the null hypothesis that the use
of instrumental variables doesnt change the estimation outcome. We report the
instrumental variable estimates when we reject the null hypothesis at 10% or be-
low. For the full sample, the estimates by Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) suggest
that industries in initially richer countries tend to grow slower; sectors that have
witnessed high growth rates in the past are likely to grow at slower rates in the
future and that higher levels of banking development are associated with higher
industrial growth rates. These results are consistent with cross-country growth
regressions (see Barro and Sala-i- Martin, 1992; King and Levine, 1993a,b). As
to the impact of banking concentration on growth, their results suggest that
banking concentration has an adverse impact on industrial growth.15
However, splitting the sample into high-income and low-income groups and
estimating the growth equation (3.1) for each sub-sample suggest that the neg-
ative relationship between banking concentration and industrial growth found
in the full sample holds only for low income countries. SpeciÞcally, Table 1
shows that the eﬀect of banking concentration on industrial growth is diﬀerent
across low-income and high-income countries where the coeﬃcient on banking
concentration is negative and highly signiÞcant in the former countries, but
no signiÞcant in the latter ones. We use the Chow test to test if the coeﬃ-
cients on all variables diﬀer across by income group. Based on the Chow-test
(Chow-Test-1 in Table 1), we reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level implying
that the estimated coeﬃcients are diﬀerent across high-income and low-income
countries. We also employ the Chow-test to test the null hypothesis that the
coeﬃcients on banking concentration are the same across the high-income and
low income countries. Based on this test (Chow-Test-2 in Table 1), we reject
the null hypothesis.
As can be seen from Table 1, these results are robust to the inclusion of
human capital, stock market capitalization and accounting standards as addi-
tional control variables. In fact, the diﬀerences in the estimated coeﬃcients on
15Cetorelli and Gamberas empirical study goes beyond the analysis of the average growth-
eﬀect of banking concentration, where they examine the impact of concentration on the degree
of Þnancial dependence of various categories of Þrms and industries.
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banking concentration across the two income groups become larger as additional
control variables are included. For instance, in the speciÞcation that includes
all the control variables used in this study, the coeﬃcient on banking concentra-
tion variable is much larger and retains its high signiÞcance for the low-income
group, whereas it is insigniÞcant in the high-income group. This is conÞrmed
by the Chow-test which indicates a strong rejection of the null hypothesis that
the coeﬃcients on banking concentration are the same in the high-income and
low-income countries.
Next, we use the Þve-bank concentration ratio suggested by Cetorelli and
Gambera (2001) as an alternative measure of concentration to check that our
results are robust to the arbitrary choice of focusing on the sum of the market
shares of the top three banks. In addition, we use the alternative measure based
on the relative position of countries in the ranking of banking concentration.
This measure allows the possibility that averages over the period 1980-1989 are
diﬀerent from those over the period 1989-1996, but requires that countries keep
their position in the ranking, which is a much less stringent condition.16 As can
be seen from Table 2, the results are very similar to those obtained previously.
The negative relationship between concentration of the banking system and
industrial growth found in the full sample holds only for low-income countries
whereas there is no signiÞcant relationship between banking concentration and
industrial growth in the high-income group.17
4. Concluding Remarks
Various theoretical and empirical contributions have established that the devel-
opment of the banking system is positively associated with long run economic
growth. An important aspect of this association, which has been subject to
much less research, is whether the attributes of the banking system matter for
growth. This paper focuses on one such attribute: the concentration in the
banking industry. This paper presents an endogenous OLG model in which the
impact of a reduction in banking concentration on economic growth depends
on the trade-oﬀ between two eﬀects. On the one hand, it enhances economic
growth by inducing economies of specialisation. On the other hand, it results in
higher duplication costs which is detrimental for growth. The trade-oﬀ between
16For a detailed description of the various measures of banking concentrations, see Cetorelli
et al (2001).
17The results for the other speciÞcations that include human capital, accounting standards
and stock market capitalisation dont alter signiÞcantly and hence are not reported here.
These results are available from authors upon request.
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these two eﬀects determines whether a more concentrated banking market struc-
ture is conducive for growth. Another insight of this study is that the trade-oﬀ
between the specialization and duplication eﬀects can vary along the process
of economic development. This has important empirical implications since the
model predicts that concentration may not necessarily have a uniform impact
on economic growth across countries. Instead, the relationship between concen-
tration and growth is likely to be diﬀerent across countries depending on their
level of economic development. The empirical results support this hypothesis
where we Þnd that banking concentration has an adverse impact on industrial
growth only in low-income countries. They are also consistent with the models
prediction that, under decreasing returns to specialisation, an increase in com-
petition is more likely to promote growth in low income countries, while in high
income countries the beneÞts from further specialisation may not be signiÞcant
enough to oﬀset the costs of duplication, so that further competition may not
be conducive for growth in these countries.
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Table 1- The Average effect of bank concentration on industrial growth 
  Cons SHARE CONC3 BANK LGCAP80 HUMAN80 MCAP80 ACCST R2 OBS Durbin-Wu-Haus












F(1,1046) = 0.60 
p-value =0.438 












F(1,536) = 0.87 
p-value=0.35 












F(1,435) = 0.02 
p-value = 0.88 
Chow Test I F(39,1028) = 3.94 




   
Chow Test II F(1,1028)=4.21 




   














F(1,1011) = 0.26 
p-value = 0.60 














F(1,535) = 0.76 
p-value=0.38 














F(1,434) = 0.12 
p-value = 0.72 
Chow Test I F(40,1026) = 4.10 




   
Chow Test II F(1,1026) =7.33 




   
















F(1,1010) = 0.29 
p-value = 0.59 
















F(1,534) = 1.26 
p-value=0.26 
















F(1,433) = 1.12 
p-value = 0.29 
Chow Test I F(41,1024) = 4.37 




   
Chow Test II F(1,1024) = 4.48 




   















(0.026) 0.223 950 
F(1,908) = 8.73 
p-value=0.00 















(0.028) 0.384 576 
F(1,533) = 0.69 
p-value = 0.41 















(0.112) 0.378 374 
F( 1,331) = 6.46 
p-value=0.01 
Chow Test I F(42,866) =4.67 




   
Chow Test II F(1,868) = 12.23 




   
*** indicates significant 1% significance level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Notes to Table 1 
The dependent variable is the average compounded rate of growth of real value added for each industrial sector in each country over the 
period 1980-1990. SHARE is industry js share of manufacturing in country k.  BANK represents banking development measured by the ratio 
private credit to GDP. CONC3 represents banking concentration measured by the sum of market shares (in terms of total assets) of the three 
largest banks averaged over the period 1989-1996. LGCAP80 is initial income per capita measured by the log of per capita income in 1980.  
HUMAN80 represents initial human capital measured by the average school years in the population over 25 in 1980. MCAP80 is stock 
market capitalization to GDP in 1980. ACCST represents the quality of accounting standards. Industry dummy variables are included in all 
regressions, but we dont report their coefficient estimates. Country dummy variables are not included in these regressions. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. OBS is the number of observations. The Durbin-Wu-Hausmann 
statistics test the null hypothesis that the use of instrumental variables doesnt change the estimation outcome. We report the IV estimates 
when the null hypothesis is rejected at 10% or less. The instruments used are: the rule of law, legal origin, total GDP and population. Chow 
test (I) tests the null hypothesis that the coefficient vectors are the same in the high-income and low-income groups. Chow test (II) tests the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients on CONC3 are the same in the high-income group and low-income group. Mills ratio is included in sub-
samples regressions to correct for possible sample selection bias. The Mills ratios were obtained from a probit model in which includes initial 
human capital and initial GDP per capita as regressors. The high income countries are: Sweden, Norway, Germany, Denmark, France, 
Belgium, Netherlands, Canada, Finland, Japan, Australia, UK, Austria, New Zealand, Italy, Spain, Greece, Israel, Singapore, and Portugal. 
The low-income countries are: Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Egypt, Philippines, Morocco, Peru, Turkey, 
Jordan, Colombia, Korea, Brazil, Malaysia, Costa Rica, Chile, Mexico, South Africa, and Venezuela.  
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Table 2- The Average effect of bank concentration on industrial growth 
  Constant SHARE BANK LGCAP80 CONC5 RANK3 R2 OBS Durbin-Wu-Hausman












F(1,1046) = 0.72 
p-value = 0.396 













p-value = 0.23 













F(1,435) = 0.02 
p-value=0.89 





   





   












F(1,1046) = 0.70 
p-value = 0.401 











(0.0001) 0.293 576 
F(1,536) = 0.80 
p-value = 0.37 











(0.0005) 0.216 530 
F(1,435) =0.00 
p-value=0.96 





   





   
*** indicates significant 1% significance level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level  
 
Notes to Table 2 
The dependent variable is the average compounded rate of growth of real value added for each industrial sector in each country over the period 1980-1990. 
SHARE is industry js share of manufacturing in country k.  BANK represents banking development measured by the ratio private credit to GDP. CONC5 
represents banking concentration measured by the sum of market shares (in terms of total assets) of the five largest banks averaged over the period 1989-
1996. RANK 3 is the rank of the three-bank ratio. LGCAP80 is initial income per capita measured by the log of per capita income in 1980. Industry dummy 
variables are included in all regressions, but we dont report their coefficient estimates. Country dummy variables are not included in these regressions. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. OBS is the number of observations. The Durbin-Wu-Hausmann statistics test the 
null hypothesis that the use of instrumental variables doesnt change the estimation outcome. We report the IV estimates when the null hypothesis is 
rejected at 10% or less. The instruments used are: the rule of law, legal origin, total GDP and population. Chow test (I) tests the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient vectors are the same in the high-income and low-income groups. Chow test (II) tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients on CONC3 are the 
same in the high-income group and low-income group. Mills ratio is included in sub-samples regressions to correct for possible sample selection bias. The 
Mills ratios were obtained from a probit model in which includes initial human capital and initial GDP per capita as regressors. The high income countries 
are: Sweden, Norway, Germany, Denmark, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Canada, Finland, Japan, Australia, UK, Austria, New Zealand, Italy, Spain, 
Greece, Israel, Singapore, and Portugal. The low-income countries are: Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Egypt, Philippines, 
Morocco, Peru, Turkey, Jordan, Colombia, Korea, Brazil, Malaysia, Costa Rica, Chile, Mexico, South Africa, and Venezuela. 
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Table 3- The Average effect of bank concentration on industrial growth (Mills ratio not included) 
  Constant SHARE CONC3 BANK LGCAP80 HUMAN80 MCAP80 ACCST R2 OBS Durbin-Wu-Hausman












F(1,1046) = 0.60 
p-value =0.438 












F(1,537) = 0.71 
p-value=0.398 












F(1,470) = 0.11 
p-value = 0.736 
Chow Test I F(38,1074) = 3.62




   
Chow Test II F(1,1074)=5.37 




   














F(1,1011) = 0.26 
p-value = 0.608 














F(1,536) = 1.42 
p-value=0.233 














F(1,435) = 0.03 
p-value = 0.862 
Chow Test I F(39,1028) = 3.71




   
Chow Test II F(1,1028) =10.21




   
















F(1,1010) = 0.29 
p-value = 0.59 
















F(1,535) = 1.27 
p-value=0.26 
















F(1,434) = 6.99 
p-value = 0.00 
Chow Test I F(40,1028) = 4.13




   
Chow Test II F(1,1028) = 6.78 




   















(0.026) 0.222 950 
F(1,909) = 8.73 
p-value=0.00 















(0.025) 0.384 576 
F(1,534) = 0.69 
p-value = 0.40 















(0.089) 0.337 374 
F( 1,332) = 0.14 
p-value=0.70 
Chow Test I F(41,868) =4.23 




   
Chow Test II F(1,868) = 24.28 




   
*** indicates significant 1% significance level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; * indicates significance at the 10% level;    
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Notes to Table 3 
The dependent variable is the average compounded rate of growth of real value added for each industrial sector in each country over the 
period 1980-1990. SHARE is industry js share of manufacturing in country k.  BANK represents banking development measured by the ratio 
private credit to GDP. CONC3 represents banking concentration measured by the sum of market shares (in terms of total assets) of the three 
largest banks averaged over the period 1989-1996. LGCAP80 is initial income per capita measured by the log of per capita income in 1980.  
HUMAN80 represents initial human capital measured by the average school years in the population over 25 in 1980. MCAP80 is stock 
market capitalization to GDP in 1980. ACCST represents the quality of accounting standards. Industry dummy variables are included in all 
regressions, but we dont report their coefficient estimates. Country dummy variables are not included in these regressions. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. OBS is the number of observations. The Durbin-Wu-Hausmann 
statistics test the null hypothesis that the use of instrumental variables doesnt change the estimation outcome. We report the IV estimates 
when the null hypothesis is rejected at 10% or less. The instruments used are: the rule of law, legal origin, total GDP and population. Chow 
test (I) tests the null hypothesis that the coefficient vectors are the same in the high-income and low-income groups. Chow test (II) tests the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients on CONC3 are the same in the high-income group and low-income group. The high income countries are: 
Sweden, Norway, Germany, Denmark, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Canada, Finland, Japan, Australia, UK, Austria, New Zealand, Italy, 
Spain, Greece, Israel, Singapore, and Portugal. The low-income countries are: Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Kenya, Zimbabwe, 





Table 4- The Average effect of bank concentration on industrial growth (Mills Ratio not included) 













F(1,1046) = 0.72 
p-value = 0.396 













p-value = 0.218 












F(1,470) = 0.12 
p-value=0.734 





   


















(0.0002) 0.128 1150 
F(1,1046) = 0.70 
p-value = 0.40 











(0.0001) 0.282 576 
F(1,537) = 0.63 













(0.0005) 0.199 574 
F(1,470) = 0.00 
p-value=0.986 





   





   
 
*** indicates significant 1% significance level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; * indicates significance at the 10% level;   
Notes to Table 4 
The dependent variable is the average compounded rate of growth of real value added for each industrial sector in each country over the period 1980-
1990. SHARE is industry js share of manufacturing in country k.  BANK represents banking development measured by the ratio private credit to GDP 
averaged over the period 1980-1990. CONC5 represents banking concentration measured by the sum of market shares (in terms of total assets) of the five 
largest banks averaged over the period 1989-1996. RANK 3 is the rank of the three-bank ratio. LGCAP80 is initial income per capita measured by the log 
of per capita income in 1980. Industry dummy variables are included in all regressions, but we dont report their coefficient estimates. Note that country 
dummy variables are not included in these regressions. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. OBS is the number of 
observations. The Durbin-Wu-Hausmann statistics test the null hypothesis that the use of instrumental variables doesnt change the estimation outcome. 
We report the IV estimates when the null hypothesis is rejected at 10% or less. The instruments used are: the rule of law, legal origin, total GDP and 
population. Chow test (I) tests the null hypothesis that the coefficient vectors are the same in the high-income group and low-income group. Chow test (II) 
tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients on CONC3 are the same in the high-income group and low-income group.  The high income countries are: 
Sweden, Norway, Germany, Denmark, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Canada, Finland, Japan, Australia, UK, Austria, New Zealand, Italy, Spain, Greece, 
Israel, Singapore, and Portugal. The low-income countries are: Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Egypt, Philippines, Morocco, 
Peru, Turkey, Jordan, Colombia, Korea, Brazil, Malaysia, Costa Rica, Chile, Mexico, South Africa, and Venezuela.  
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